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the reasons given for the decision in the Sierra case were 
aberrational, and they should not be given fresh currency now 
merely because this is another boundary dispute case. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1958. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[Sac. No. 6841. In Bank. Mar. 7, 1958.] 
MAYLON COOTS, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Limi-
tation of Actions.-An action under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act for personal injuries due to dermatitis was not 
barred by the three-year limitation provision of the statute (45 
U.S.C. §56), though the disease first manifested itself more 
than three years prior to commencement of the action, where 
plaintiff, who then had his "hands in solution [cyanide]" and 
noticed small blisters and pimples thereon which caused itch-
ing, went to the company hospital where one of defendant's 
doctors diagnosed the difficulty as "Dermatitis, moderately 
severe, both hands"; where the report, which plaintiff signed, 
showed that his hands were then merely "dressed with lotion," 
and he was "advised," but he was not advised to stop the 
particular work on which he was then engaged; where he was 
consequently "blamelessly ignorant" that the "moderately 
severe" dermatitis suffered by him would lead to disability; 
and where he was disabled or prevented, by this employment-
connected disease, from performing his usual work "from time 
to time" within the statutory period. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County. Jay L. Henry, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries due to dermatitis. 
Judgment for defendant reversed. 
(1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, § 89 et seq. 
M:cK. Dig. Reference: [1] Master and Servant, § 204. 
Devlin, 
Respondent. 
& Wulff and Forrest A. Plant for 
CARTER, J. This is an appeal by plaintiff, Maylon Coots, 
from a judgment entered after trial the court upon the 
defendant's motion, to section 597 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, that the statute of limitations 
as set forth in defendant's fourth special defense barred plain-
tiff's cause of action. 
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant Southern Pacific Com-
pany, commenced his action under the provisions of the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act on October 11, 1954, to 
recover for personal injuries sustained by him. Section 56 
of the act (45 U.S.C.A.) provides that no action can be 
maintained thereunder unless commenced within three years 
from the date the cause of action accrued. 
Plaintiff began working in silver cyanide solution in defend-
ant's plating department in either December, 1947, or Janu-
ary, 1948. Sometime in 1949 he noticed small blisters and 
pimples on his hands which caused itching. In July, 1949, 
he went to the Southern Pacific Hospital where one of defend-
ant's doctors diagnosed the difficulty as "Dermatitis, moder-
ately severe, both hands." The report, under date of July 8, 
1949 (Defendant's Exhibit B), shows that plaintiff signed a 
statement which attributed the skin difficulty on his hands with 
''Filtering cyanide solution which gets on hands causing a 
dermatitis" and "Having hands in solution." The report 
shows that the hands were "dressed with lotion" and plain-
tiff was ''advised.'' The condition of plaintiff's hands became 
"real worse" in May or June of 1953; thereafter the condition 
spread to other parts of his body and became more severe 
and as of June, 1955, he was unable to work. On July 14, 
1955, plaintiff was admitted to defendant's hospital. Appar-
ently plaintiff was not advised to discontinue his work until 
he was discharged from defendant's hospital on September 12, 
1955. On the report (under date of July 8, 1949) signed by 
defendant's doctor, appears the following question and 
answer: "11 Give probable duration of disability." "None." 
(Emphasis added.) 
[1] Plaintiff contends that his cause of action did not 
accrue until he became disabled and unable to work in June, 
1955. Defendant's position is that plaintiff's cause of action 
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accrued when he first became aware of his employment-
connected Both plaintiff and defendant rely on the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thomp-
son, 337 U.S. 163 [69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 11 A.L.R.2d 
252], in of their 
In the Urie case the claimant sought relief under the 
Federal Act for due to silicosis 
contracted the course of his The Supreme 
Court there rejected the defendant's argument that because 
the claimant had been exposed to silica dust for 31 years prior 
to the commencement of his action he was barred by the pro-
visions of section 56, title 45, of the United States Code. De-
fendant here argues that the court held that ''awareness'' 
of the disease rather than "disability" from it was the con-
trolling factor in the Urie case. We do not so understand the 
Urie case. 
The court in the Uric case had this to say (p. 168 et seq.): 
"Urie filed suit on November 25, 1941. Under the terms 
of the then prevailing three-year statute of limitations [ 45 
U.S.C.A. §56], the court could not entertain the claim if 
Urie's 'cause of action accrued' before November 25, 1938. 
Respondent contends that Urie, having been exposed to silica 
dust since approximately 1910, must unwittingly have con-
tracted silicosis long before 1938, and hence that his 'cause 
of action' must be deemed to have 'accrued' longer than three 
years before the institution of this action. Alternatively it 
may be argued that each inhalation of silica dust was a sep-
arate tort giving rise to a fresh 'cause of action,' and that 
Urie is therefore limited to a claim for inhalation between 
November 25, 1938, and the spring day in 1940 when he be-
came incapacitated. 
"In our view, however, neither of the outlined construc-
tions of the statute of limitations can be sustained. For, if 
we assume that Congress intended to include occupational 
diseases in the category of injuries compensable under the 
Federal Employers' Liability and Boiler Inspection Acts, 
such mechanical analysis of the 'accrual' of petitioner's injury 
-whether breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment 
in the progress of the disease-can only serve to thwart the 
congressional purpose. 
"If Urie were held barred from prosecuting this action 
because he must be said, as a matter of law, to have con-
tracted silicosis prior to November 25, 1938, it would be 
clear that the federal legislation afforded Urie only a. de-
808 CooTS v. SouTHERN PACIFIC Co. [49 C.2d 
lusive remedy. It would mean that at some past moment in 
time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retro-
spect, Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic 
disintegration of his lungs; under this view Urie's failure 
to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a 
disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his con-
sciousness would constitute waiver of his right to compensa-
tion at the ultimate day of discovery and disability. 
"Nor can we accept the theory that each intake of dusty 
breath is a fresh 'cause of action.' In the present case, for 
example, application of such a rule would, arguably limit 
petitioner's damages to that aggravation of his progressive 
injury traceable to the last eighteen months of his employ-
ment. Moreover petitioner would have been wholly barred 
from suit had he left the railroad, or merely been trans-
ferred to work involving no exposure to silica dust, more than 
three years before discovering the disease with which he was 
aftl.icted. 
"We do not think the humane legislative plan intended 
such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do 
we think those consequences can be reconciled with the tradi-
tional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally 
require the assertion of claims within a specified period of 
time after notice of the invasion of legal rights. The record 
before us is clear that Urie became too ill to work in May 
of 1940 and that diagnosis of his condition was accomplished 
in the following weeks. There is no suggestion that Urie 
should have known he had silicosis at any earlier date. 'It 
follows that no specific date of contact with the substance 
can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the 
injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a 
period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the 
aftl.icted employee can be held to be "injured" only when the 
accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest 
themselves .... ' Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial 
Accident Commission, 124 Cal.App. 378, 381 [12 P.2d 1075]. 
The quoted language, used in a state workmen's compensation 
case, seems to us applicable in every relevant particular to 
the construction of the federal statute of limitations with 
which we are here concerned.'' 
Defendant attaches much significance to the phrase "blame-
less ignorance'' used by the court and to the fact that only 
part of the sentence found in the California Industrial Acci-
dent Commission case was quoted by the court. If we were 
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as contended 
matter of law 
been transferred to 
more than three 
years before disease which he was af-
flicted." In this connection it is that at no time 
prior to the time became disabled from ex-
posure to the solution with which he was working did de-
fendant's doctors advise him to stop that particular work. 
The balance of the from the California case 
(124 CaLApp. at 381) is as follows: "[A]nd this would be 
when the employee becomes disabled and entitled to com-
pensation, that is, when under the well-established meaning 
of the term 'disability,' as used in compensation law, there 
is a combination of partial or total physical incapacity and 
of inability to work." Defendant argues that because the 
Supreme Court of the United States did not include in its 
quotation the entire sentence in the California decision that 
it did not mean to hold that the time of partial or total 
physical incapacity and inability to work was the time from 
which the statute of limitations began to run. It will be re-
called that the Supreme Court approved the holding of the 
California court that "the afflicted employee can be held to 
be 'injured' only when the accttmulated effects of the de-
leterious substance manifest themselves . ... " (Emphasis 
added.) As the Supreme Court said in the Urie case (p. 187): 
''We do not think the mere difference in the time required for 
different acts of negligence to take effect and disclose their 
harmful, disabling consequences would justify excluding the 
one type of injury from the Act's coverage or that such an 
exclusion would be consistent with its language, purposes, or 
unvarying standards of construction." The Supreme Court 
in the Urie case specifically notes that it has followed a 
''constant and established course of liberal construction 
. . . " of the remedial and humanitarian purposes of the 
Federal Employers' I,iability Act (337 U.S. 163, 181, 182). 
ln Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 [50 S.Ct. 440, 
810 CooTs v. SouTHERN PAciFIC C.2d 
74 L.Ed. 1082], it was held that "The Act is not to be 
narrowed by refined It is to be construed 
liberally to fulfill the purposes for which it was enacted. . . . '' 
In an exhaustive note on this subject in 11 American Law 
Reports 2d at pages 277, 279, 297, the writer notes that "As 
to a claim arising under a workmen's compensation or oc-
cupational disease statute, it is much more reasonable to re-
gard the time of disability as the time of the beginning of the 
running of limitations than is true of a cause of action for 
tort causing exposure to, and eventual, disease, the usual 
purpose of the occupational disease and workmen's compen-
sation statutes being simply to provide for disability. But 
if it happens in a particular negligence case, as it often must, 
that disability is approximately coincident with manifesta-
tion of the disease, a reference to the statute as running from 
the time of disability may not be objectionable, as limited to 
that case." 
We have concluded that plaintiff was "blamelessly igno-
rant" that the "moderately severe" dermatitis suffered by 
him in 1949 would lead to disability and that under no view 
of the evidence can it be said that the statute begins to run 
at any earlier time than in the year 1953 when the condition 
became "real worse." It is not necessary, however, for us 
to determine whether the statute began to run in 1953 or in 
1954 when, according to the allegations of plaintiff's com-
plaint, his employment-connected disease prevented him from 
performing his usual work ''from time to time'' inasmuch 
as either time is well within the statute of limitations. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., 
concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I concur in the reversal of the judgment, 
In my opinion, however, this court should more clearly set 
forth the rule for determining when the cause of action ac-
crues and the statute of limitations commences to run in 
cases which are brought under the federal act and which 
involve progressive diseases. The majority opinion neces-
sarily holds that the statute did not commence to run in this 
case at the time of the :first minor manifestation of plain-
tiff's dermatitis in 1949; but it implies that the statute may 
not have commenced to run until some five years thereafter 
when plaintiff became disabled for work in 1954 or 1955. The 
vice of the failure of the majority to determine just when the 
Mar.1958] CooTs v. SouTHERN PACIFIC Co. 
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statute did commence to run is that it leaves the decision here 
open to the charge that it is inconsistent with the decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Urie v. Thompson, 337 
U.S. 163 [69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 11 A.hR.2d 252]. 
Both plaintiff and defendant rely upon their conflicting 
versions of the effect of the decision in the Uric case. That 
was a silicosis case in which the first known manifestation 
of that serious disease was practically simultaneous with the 
employee's disability to work. As the court there said at 
page 170 : ''The record before us is clear that Uric became too 
ill to work in May of 1940 and that diagnosis of his condition 
was accomplished in the following weeks. There is no sug-
gestion that Urie should have known he had silicosis at any 
earlier date." It was further said that the afflicted em-
ployee can be held to be "injured" only "when the accumu-
lated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves." 
Defendant would have this court adopt a strict construction 
of this language and hold that the statute commenced to run 
in the present case at the time of the first minor manifestation 
of plaintiff's dermatitis in 1949. On the other hand, plaintiff 
would have us adopt the reasoning of the Missouri Supreme 
Court in the Urie case ( Vrie v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 211 [176 
S.W.2d 471] ), and hold that the statute did not commence to 
run until plaintiff became disabled in 1954 or 1955. Both 
courts reached the same result in the Urie case upon different 
lines of reasoning but only because there the time when the ac-
cumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifested them-
selves and the time when the employee became disabled were 
for all practical purposes one and the same time. It is signifi-
cant, however, that the United States Supreme Court care-
fully refrained from adopting the reasoning of the Missouri 
Supreme Court in deciding the Urie case. 
It appears to me that the reasoning in the majority opinion 
tends to confuse the time of the commencement of the period 
of limitations in a workmen's compensation case with the 
time of such commencement in a negligence case. The dis-
tinction between the two types of cases for this purpose is 
clearly indicated in an annotation to Urie v. Thompson, supra, 
337 U.S. 163 (11 A.L.R.2d 277). 
The present action is a negligence action, as it is based 
upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. §51 
et seq.). Unlike the ordinary proceeding instituted under 
a workmen's compensation statute or au occupational disease 
statute, negligence, rather than disability, is the basis upon 




"""'"uau,5 of the running of limita-
action for tort causing exposure 
to, and the usual purpose of the occupa-
tional disease and workmen's statutes being 
simply to for Btlt if it happens in a par-
tic1tlar case, as it rnnst, that disability is 
approximately coincident u·ith manifestation the disease, a 
reference to the staf1de as from the time of disability 
may not be objectionable, as limited to that case." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the present case, however, the uncontradicted factual 
background shows that "disability" was not "approximately 
coincident with manifestation of the disease," and therefore 
any implication in the majority opinion that the statute of 
limitations may not have commenced to run until the time of 
plaintiff's actual to work is not only objectionable, 
but it appears to be inconsistent with the rule above quoted 
from the of the United States Supreme Court in 
the Urie case. 
The question then arises as to whether the conclusion can 
be reached here under the uncontradicted facts that the 
statute of limitations had not barred plaintiff's action in line 
with the "constant and established course of liberal construc-
tion" of the federal act (Urie v. Thompson, supra, 337 U.S. 
163, 181-182), and without doing violence to the rule enunci-
ated in the Urie case. I believe that this conclusion can and 
should be reached. A brief statement of that factual back-
ground should suffice. 
Plaintiff's is defined as "Inflammation o:f 
the derma, or true skin" 's New International Dic-
tionary, 2d , first manifested itsE'lf on his hands in a 
relatively minor way in 1949. He then claimed that it was 
caused by ' hands in solution [cyanide] " while en-
gaged in his work. Defendant's doctors, who treated plaintiff 
tinned his work and 
It was not until 
his hands became 
of his body. The n>'t\O'P0Q 
vent him from until 
His 
solution. 
tl1e condition of 
to other parts 
pre-
Under the circumstances of this case, I am 
of the opinion that it should be held cause of 
action accrued and of limitations commenced to 
run in when there was the first manifestation of sub-
stantial harm to and tl1at therefore his cause of 
action was not barred by the statute when the suit 
was commenced in 1954. 
While no case directly in this may 
be explained the fact that cases involving 
progressive where the ' '' results from con-
tinued exposure rather than from traumatic causes, have been 
relatively few in number and by the further fact that in the 
few cases, including the Urie case, which have reached the 
appellate courts, the disease was of such nature that the mani-
festation of substantial harm has ordinarily been practically 
simultaneous with the to continue work. Hence this 
case, in a very real sense, must be considered one of first 
impression. This is not the first time, however, that this court 
has been called upon to innovate rules to meet the peculiar 
problems facing the who may suffer from a pro-
gressive disease from his employment. (See Colonial 
Ins. Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. 29 Cal.2d 79 [172 P.2d 884) .) 
Nevertheless, we are here dealing with a case arising under 
the federal act, and it is imperative that any rule which we 
apply should be consistent with the federal decisions such as 
Urie v. Thompson, supra, 337 U.S. 163, and James v. Pennsyl-
814 C.2d 
vania R.R. The above suggested theory 
is consistent with those decisions, but the in the 
majority opinion that the cause of action may not have ac-
crued with plaintiff's actual inability to work appears to be 
inconsistent therewith. 
The theory that the cause of action should not be deemed 
to have accrued here until the manifestation of substantial 
harm finds support in the comments on the Urie decision. "It 
would seem preferable, in all cases where the harm is of a 
gradually increasing and inherently unknowable nature, to 
delay commencement of the statutory period until manifesta-
tion of substantial harm." (Emphasis added; Development 
in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177, 
1207.) It further finds support in the language used in 
Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills Oo., 150 Ore. 
304 [ 42 P.2d 921, 929, 99 A.L.R. 244], where the court speaks 
of the time when the disease has reached "substantial propor-
tions and had infiicted upon hirn an appreciable injury.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
This theory offers a practical approach to the problem, 
and it achieves a just result. The minor manifestation of skin 
trouble on plaintiff's hands prior to 1953 was of such nature 
that it may be treated as de rninirnis. It was so treated by 
the parties and it is a maxim of our jurisprudence that ''The 
law disregards trifles." ( Civ. Code, § 3533.) Human experi-
ence indicates that comparable conditions ordinarily terminate 
with the passage of a brief period of time; and it does not 
comport with sound public policy to require an employee, 
at his peril, to engage in litigation with his employer when an 
apparently minor and temporary manifestation of skin trouble 
occurs. It now appears that with the continuation of his 
work and continued exposure to the cyanide solution, the 
harm was essentially of a "gradually increasing and inher-
ently unknowable nature," at least until such time as it had 
resulted in substantial harm to plaintiff. That harm which 
appeared minor and temporary prior to 1953 clearly became 
substantial in that year, when the skin trouble became worse 
and spread to other parts of plaintiff's body. Thus it was not 
until 1953 that it may be fairly said that the accumulated 
effects of the exposure manifested themselves in substantial 
harm to plaintiff. Under these circumstances it seems logical 
to conclude that the statute did not begin to run until such 
"manifestation of substantial harm" in 1953. In my opinion, 
Mar. VATER v. CouNTY OF Gr.:mNN 
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the United States Supreme Court would have arrived at a 
similar conclusion if it had had this particular problem be-
fore it in the Urie case. 
In view of my conclusion that it should be held that the 
statute of limitations did not commence to run until the 
manifestation of substantial harm in 1953, it is unnecessary 
to consider in any event, defendant employer should 
be held to have waived the of the statute of limitations 
for the period during which plaintiff continued to work at 
the same employment with defendant's consent and continued 
to receive treatment from defendant's medical facilities for 
an affliction which appeared to be of a relatively minor and 
temporary nature. 
For the reasons stated, I concur in the reversal of the 
judgment. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent, for the reasons expressed by Mr. 
Justice Warne in the opinion prepared by him for the District 
Court of Appeal, (Cal.App.) 311 P.2d 40. 
[Sac. No. 6826. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1958.] 
GRACE MARIE VATER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF 
GLI1JNN et al., Defendants; GLENN-COLUSA HnU-
GATION DISTRICT, Respondent. 
[1] State of California-Tort Liability.-Generally, in the absence 
of a statutory or constitutional provision to the contrary, the 
state nnd its agencies are immune from liability for tort in the 
discharge of governmental duties and activities. 
[2] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Liability in Tort.-The general 
rule of immunity of the state and its agencies from liability for 
tort in the discharge of governmental duties and activities is 
applicable to irrigation districts. 
[3] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability in Tort.- W at. Code, 
§§ 22730, 22731, relating to public liability of irrigation dis· 
tricts, show a legislative intent not to abrogate the rule of 
governmental immunity from tort liability for irrigation dis-
(1] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
States, Territories and Dependencies, §§ 73, 75 et seq. 
[2) See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 644; Am.Jur,. Irrigation, § 85. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] State of California,§ 57; (2, 3] 
Waters, §549; [6] Nuisances, §49; Waters, §549. 
